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MORE CARROT, LESS STICK: 
WORKPLACE WELLNESS PROGRAMS & 
THE DISCRIMINATORY IMPACT OF 
FINANCIAL AND HEALTH-BASED 
INCENTIVES 
EMILY KORUDA* 
Abstract: In recent years, more and more employers are turning to workplace 
wellness programs to combat rising health care costs by rewarding employees for 
improving their health-related behaviors and penalizing those who do not attain 
measureable health outcomes. Yet these wellness programs run counter to the 
goals of improving the overall health and livelihood of employees when they 
shift health care costs onto the employees who need lower premiums the most. 
There is little evidence that these programs can avoid being discriminatory. This 
Note analyzes the disparate impact of workplace wellness programs on low-
income individuals, individuals with disabilities, and certain racial minorities. It 
explains how employers utilize wellness programs as a subterfuge for discrimina-
tory cost-shifting—in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964—that decreases access to, and affordability 
of, quality health care services. This Note argues that, in order to rectify the dis-
criminatory effects of these programs, the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission must issue explicit guidance and exercise its power effectively as an 
enforcer of anti-discrimination law. Additionally, the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act must be modified to better define “voluntariness” within 
the realm of incentives and penalties. 
INTRODUCTION 
Dale Arnold, an employee of Flambeau, Inc. (“Flambeau”), a Wisconsin-
based manufacturer and distributor of industrial, commercial, and consumer 
plastic, went on medical leave in 2011 for treatment of his cardiomyopathy and 
congestive heart failure.1 In December 2011, while Arnold was on leave, 
Flambeau asked its employees to complete biometric testing and health risk 
                                                                                                                           
 * Executive Note Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE JOURNAL OF LAW & SOCIAL JUSTICE, 2015–2016. 
 1 Complaint at 2, 3–4, Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Flambeau, Inc., Docket No. 
3:14-cv-00638 (W.D. Wis. 2014) [hereinafter EEOC Complaint against Flambeau]. Cardiomyopathy 
is a heart muscle disease that can disrupt normal cardiac function. Liana Daley et al., A Patient’s 
Journey: Cardiomyopathy, 340 BRIT. MED. J. 808, 809 (2010). 
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assessments as part of the company’s wellness program.2 The biometric testing 
collected blood work and various body measurements.3 The health assessment 
asked each worker to disclose his or her medical history and answer disability-
related questions.4 Upon returning from his medical leave, Arnold attempted to 
complete both the health assessment and biometric testing.5 The allotted time 
to fulfill the requirements as determined by Flambeau, however, had passed, 
and Arnold’s requests to complete the testing were subsequently rejected.6 
Under Flambeau’s wellness plan, employees who completed the assess-
ment and testing during the designated time frame were only required to pay 
twenty-five percent of their health insurance premium.7 If an employee failed 
to meet these requirements, he or she would be penalized by being required to 
pay the entire premium for his or her health insurance coverage.8 Because Ar-
nold did not fulfill the program requirements—due to his medical-related ab-
sence—Flambeau shifted the entire cost of the premium onto him.9 Arnold was 
unable to afford this penalty, and his coverage was subsequently terminated on 
January 6, 2012.10 Arnold then alerted the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) of the termination.11 In 2014, the EEOC filed a lawsuit 
against Flambeau alleging that the health risk evaluation and biometric testing 
requirements violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which pro-
hibits disability discrimination in employment, including requiring disability-
related disclosures.12 
* * * * 
In 2014, Honeywell International Inc. (“Honeywell”), an international 
manufacturer of engineering and aerospace systems and commercial and con-
                                                                                                                           
 2 EEOC Complaint against Flambeau, supra note 1, at 3–4. 
 3 Id. at 3. 
 4 Id. 
 5 Id. at 4. 
 6 Id. at 4. (“Arnold was subjected to termination of his health insurance and a financial penalty of 
having to pay the entire premium cost . . . as a result of not completing the examinations and inquiries 
. . . because Flambeau told Arnold . . . that failing to attend the testing at [his] scheduled time would 
result in ‘disciplinary action . . . .’”). 
 7 See id. 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. 
 11 See EEOC Complaint against Flambeau, supra note 1, at 2. 
 12 Id. at 4. The EEOC’s complaint contended that Flambeau’s requirements were not “voluntary” 
under the specifications required by the ADA because the penalty for noncompliance was so signifi-
cant, and that the health risk assessment and biometric testing were not job-related or consistent with 
business necessity. Id. at 5. 
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sumer products, asked its employees to participate in a wellness program.13 
Under the program’s provisions, on a voluntary basis, employees and their 
spouses were screened for cholesterol, blood pressure, body-mass index, 
blood-sugar levels, waist circumference, and nicotine.14 Honeywell offered 
employees who chose to undergo testing between $250 and $1500 credited to 
their health savings accounts.15 Employees who decided not to undergo testing 
faced several penalties, including an additional $500 payment for health insur-
ance and a $1000 surcharge based on the presumption that they use tobacco.16 
If a married employee’s spouse was covered by Honeywell’s insurance and 
refused to sit for the screening, the employee received an additional $1000 to-
bacco surcharge.17 
Honeywell claims that its corporate wellness program serves dual purpos-
es: to inform employees about their health status in an effort to support their 
overall wellbeing and to prevent healthy employees from subsidizing healthcare 
premiums for less healthy employees.18 The program works by collecting the 
cumulative data of participants.19 The employer then creates initiatives de-
signed to combat diseases prevalent among participants that contribute to ris-
ing healthcare costs, such as obesity and high blood pressure.20 
The sizable amount of money that Honeywell charges employees for non-
compliance, however, caught the attention of federal regulators.21 In October 
2014, the EEOC filed a lawsuit against Honeywell in the U.S. District Court in 
Minneapolis arguing that the program violates the ADA and the Genetic In-
formation Nondiscrimination Act (“GINA”).22 
                                                                                                                           
 13 See Lauren Weber, Wellness Program at Honeywell Faces Test, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 29, 2014, 
7:43 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/wellness-program-at-honeywell-faces-test-1414626180 [per-
ma.cc/29E2-36UY]. 
 14 Id.; Len Boselovic, Workzone: EEOC Disapproves of Incentives for Honeywell Program, 
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Nov. 9, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/business/
2014/11/09/Workzone-EEOC-disapproves-of-incentives-for-Honeywell-program/stories/20141109
0011 [perma.cc/RU35-3QR4]. 
 15 Boselovic, supra note 14. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 See Press Release, Honeywell, Honeywell Responds to EEOC’s Frivolous Lawsuit to Stop 
Company’s Biometric Screening for Employees (Oct. 29, 2014), https://honeywell.com/News/Pages/
Honeywell-Responds-to-EEOCs-Frivolous-Lawsuit-To-Stop-Companys-Biometric-Screening-for-
Employees.aspx [perma.cc/3BKU-8ZY5]. 
 19 See Boselovic, supra note 14. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Weber, supra note 13. 
 22 EEOC v. Honeywell Int’l Inc., 2014 WL 5795481, at *2 (D. Minn. 2014). The Genetic Infor-
mation Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 prohibits employer discrimination based on genetic infor-
mation and limits employer access to the genetic information of its employees. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-53 
(2014). 
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Both Flambeau’s and Honeywell’s programs are part of a growing trend 
of workplace wellness initiatives designed to improve employee health and to 
control the cost of healthcare.23 Many employers attempt to boost their well-
ness programs by setting higher health standards and rewarding employees for 
healthy behavior.24 However, as the cost of healthcare and insurance continues 
to escalate, more employers are starting to penalize noncompliant employees 
or employees with unhealthy lifestyles in an effort to avoid covering the cost 
of expensive premiums.25 
As policies imposing financial penalties on employees become the norm, 
companies have defended their decisions to implement these cost-shifting ap-
proaches.26 Some employers highlight the high healthcare costs of treating 
preventable diseases such as cardiovascular disease, diabetes, and obesity as 
justification.27 Others see incentives and penalties as a way of coaxing workers 
to take personal responsibility for, and better care of, their wellbeing.28 But if 
an employee chooses not to participate in a punitive wellness program or can-
not meet the benchmarks established by the employer, he or she is vulnerable 
to higher premiums and surcharges.29 
In addition to cost-shifting, another danger lies in the fact that employer 
programs may have a disparate impact on low-wage workers.30 If the penalties 
are set too high, employees who cannot afford to opt out may have no choice 
but to participate, effectively rendering the program mandatory.31 Additionally, 
many individuals and populations are environmentally, socioeconomically, or 
                                                                                                                           
 23 Michelle M. Mello & Meredith B. Rosenthal, Wellness Programs and Lifestyle Discrimina-
tion—The Legal Limits, 359;2 NEW ENG. J. MED. 192, 192 (2008). 
 24 Weber, supra note 13. 
 25 Id.; Robert Glatter, Corporate Wellness Programs: The Carrot or the Stick?, FORBES (Mar. 11, 
2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertglatter/2012/03/11/corporate-wellness-programs-the-carrot-
or-the-stick/ [perma.cc/7JHA-Z67V]. 
 26 See Stephen A. Burd, How Safeway Is Cutting Health-Care Costs, WALL ST. J. (June 12, 
2009), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB124476804026308603. (“While comprehensive health-
care reform needs to address a number of other key issues, [Safeway believes] that personal responsi-
bility and financial incentives are the path to a healthier America.”); Laura Anderko et al., Promoting 
Prevention Through the Affordable Care Act: Workplace Wellness, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION (Dec. 13, 2012), http://www.cdc.gov/pcd/issues/2012/12_0092.htm [perma.cc/64YA-
RF5G]. 
 27 See Anderko et al., supra note 26; Glatter, supra note 25. 
 28 See Glatter, supra note 25; see also Burd, supra note 26 (comparing personal responsibility in 
healthcare to the role personal responsibility plays in the automobile industry when establishing high-
er premiums). 
 29 See Glatter, supra note 25. 
 30 Jessica L. Roberts, Healthism and the Law of Employment Discrimination, 99 IOWA L. REV. 
571, 629 (2014). 
 31 See Reed Abelson, The Smoker’s Surcharge, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 16, 2011), http://www.
nytimes.com/2011/11/17/health/policy/smokers-penalized-with-health-insurance-premiums.html 
[perma.cc/6PSX-5AHN]. 
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genetically tied to their health statuses.32 Low-income individuals, for instance, 
have limited access to healthy, affordable foods; employer-based health 
benchmarks may be unattainable because of socioeconomic obstacles.33 Addi-
tionally, some racial minorities are more likely to have chronic diseases, such 
as obesity and heart disease, and are therefore more likely to pay higher pre-
miums.34 Corporate wellness programs that use punitive strategies to coerce 
workers to achieve health benchmarks disproportionately shift costs onto 
populations that are more likely to experience significant health disparities.35 
This Note explores the disparate impact that employer wellness programs 
offering incentives for participation impose upon low-income individuals, ra-
cial minorities, and individuals with disabilities. Part I of this Note examines 
the recent increase in popularity of employer wellness programs. It argues that 
the Affordable Care Act (ACA), combined with rising healthcare costs, are 
encouraging employers to shift the cost of health insurance onto their employ-
ees. Part II first outlines the disputed benefits of corporate wellness programs. 
It further illustrates how these possible benefits are outweighed by their poten-
tial legal ramifications, focusing on the legal parameters of the ADA and Title 
VII. This section argues that workplace wellness programs run afoul of federal 
anti-discrimination laws by placing low-income individuals, racial minorities, 
and individuals with disabilities at significant financial and health-related dis-
advantages. Finally, Part III calls for several possible solutions to discriminato-
ry workplace wellness programs, including a requirement that the EEOC issue 
clear and specific guidance regarding the framework for lawful programs, a 
recommendation that the EEOC pursue novel and significant legal cases to 
better enforce non-discriminatory laws in the workplace, and an amendment to 
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). 
I. JUMPING ON THE BANDWAGON OF EMPLOYER WELLNESS PROGRAMS 
In March 2010, President Obama signed the Patient Protection and Af-
fordable Care Act (ACA) into law.36 Enacted to increase the affordability and 
accessibility of healthcare coverage nationwide, the ACA introduced signifi-
                                                                                                                           
 32 Roberts, supra note 30, at 626. 
 33 See id. 
 34 See Written Testimony of Judith Lichtman, Senior Advisor, Nat’l Partnership for Women & 
Families, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (May 8, 2013), http://www1.eeoc.gov//
eeoc/meetings/5-8-13/lichtman.cfm [perma.cc/2XLB-97Q4] [hereinafter Written Testimony of Judith 
Lichtman]. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (2010); see Edie Lindsey, Us-
ing Incentives in Workplace Wellness Programs: The Impact of Federal Employment Discrimination 
Laws 2 (May 17, 2013) (unpublished masters thesis, Georgia State University), http://scholarworks.
gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1286&context=iph_theses [perma.cc/4327-Z7UZ]. 
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cant changes to the nation’s healthcare system.37 The ACA was designed to 
achieve a number of ambitious goals, including increasing the availability of 
health coverage for Americans—especially those with preexisting conditions—
expanding options for purchasing affordable coverage, and improving the 
overall quality of healthcare and medical services.38 Notably, the ACA also 
encourages employers to adopt wellness programs for employees.39 In an effort 
to leverage the workplace to affect healthy changes among employees, the 
ACA supports employer-based programs that screen for health risks and pro-
vide information and interventions to promote healthier lifestyles.40 
On June 3, 2013, the U.S. Departments of Treasury, Labor, and Health 
and Human Services built upon foundations established in the ACA and final-
ized new workplace wellness program regulations.41 The purpose of these new 
regulations, which went into effect on January 1, 2014, was to protect against 
discrimination in group health plans and increase the maximum reward availa-
ble to compliant employees under health-contingent wellness programs.42 A 
natural result of these changes has been a greater emphasis on the role incen-
tives and penalties play in corporate wellness programs to encourage healthier 
behavior among employees.43 
                                                                                                                           
 37 See Lindsey, supra note 36, at 2. 
 38 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 18001 et seq. (2010); Strategic Goal 1: Strengthen Health Care, U.S. DEP’T 
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV. (Mar. 10, 2014), http://www.hhs.gov/strategic-plan/goal1.html [per-
ma.cc/528L-S87U]. 
 39 Lindsey, supra note 36, at 2. 
 40 See 42 U.S.C. § 280l (2014). The statute explains that “to expand the utilization of evidence-
based prevention and health promotion approaches in the workplace,” a Director must provide em-
ployers: 
[W]ith technical assistance, consultation, tools, and other resources in evaluating such 
employers’ employer-based wellness programs, including . . . (A) measuring the partic-
ipation and methods to increase participation of employees in such programs; (B) de-
veloping standardized measures that assess policy, environmental and systems changes 
necessary to have a positive health impact on employees’ health behaviors, health out-
comes, and health care expenditures; and (C) evaluating such programs as they relate to 
changes in the health status of employees, the absenteeism of employees, the productiv-
ity of employees, the rate of workplace injury, and the medical costs incurred by em-
ployees . . . . 
Id. 
 41 See Incentives For Nondiscriminatory Wellness Programs in Group Health Plans, 78 Fed. Reg. 
33,158 (June 3, 2013). 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. at 33,171–72. The regulations explain: “In the Departments’ impact analysis for the pro-
posed rules, available data indicated that employers’ use of incentives in wellness programs was rela-
tively low.” Id. It further states, “To the extent larger rewards are more effective at improving health 
and lowering costs, these final regulations will produce more benefits than the current requirements.” 
Id. 
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A. The Rise of Employer Wellness Programs Due to the ACA  
and Rising Healthcare Costs 
The evolution of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA) provides important context for a better understanding of how incen-
tive-based wellness programs have developed under the ACA in recent years.44 
In 2006, the then ten-year-old HIPAA was amended to include wellness provi-
sions that complied with nondiscrimination requirements.45 Under new provi-
sions, employers were permitted to reward employees for participating in 
wellness programs that were directly related to a “health factor.”46 The amend-
ed regulations further expounded that the amount of the reward offered for sat-
isfying a health factor in a wellness program could not exceed twenty percent 
of the cost of employee-only coverage under the plan.47 Simply put, employers 
were permitted to reduce the insurance premiums by twenty percent for em-
ployees who participated in wellness programs.48 
New ACA regulations built upon the regulations established in HIPAA 
and increased the maximum reward available to employers under health-
contingent wellness programs.49 Employers may now implement a premium 
reduction of thirty percent for participation in a health-contingent wellness 
program, which totals approximately $1620 annually per employee.50 Further, 
if an employer is offering a wellness program designed to prevent or reduce 
tobacco use, it may charge tobacco users up to fifty percent more in premiums 
                                                                                                                           
 44 See id. at 33,159. The ACA amended the HIPAA nondiscrimination and wellness provisions of 
the Public Health Service Act. Id. 
 45 Nondiscrimination and Wellness Programs in Health Coverage in the Group Market: Final 
Rules, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,014–17 (Dec. 13, 2006). The amendments provide the final rules regulating 
the prohibition of discrimination based on a health factor for group health plans. Id. 
 46 Id. at 75,018. Defining “health factor” as any of the following related to health status: health 
status, medical condition (including both physical and mental illness), claims experience, receipt of 
healthcare, genetic information, evidence of insurability, or disability. Id. at 75,030. 
 47 Id. at 75,017. 
 48 See id. The regulations also established several other mandatory requirements for wellness 
programs. Id. at 75,018. Each program had to be “reasonably designed” to promote healthy behavior 
or prevent disease and had to provide eligible individuals the opportunity to qualify for the reward at 
least once per year. Id. at 75,036. Any rewards or benefits had to apply uniformly to all similarly situ-
ated individuals. Id. Finally, reward-based wellness programs must have provided a reasonable alter-
native for obtaining the reward for individuals for whom “it is unreasonably difficult due to a medical 
condition to meet the otherwise applicable standard, or for whom it is medically inadvisable to at-
tempt to satisfy the otherwise applicable standard.” Incentives for Nondiscriminatory Wellness Pro-
grams in Group Health Plans, 78 Fed. Reg. 33,158, 33,160 (June 3, 2013). 
 49 See Incentives for Nondiscriminatory Wellness Programs in Group Health Plans, 78 Fed. Reg. 
33,158 (June 3, 2013). 
 50 See id.; Sharon Begley, Exclusive: ‘Workplace Wellness’ Fails Bottom Line, Waistlines—
RAND, REUTERS (May 24, 2013, 6:39 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/24/us-wellness-
idUSBRE94N0XX20130524 [perma.cc/H5PH-XN47]. 
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than nonusers.51 Both of these changes are intended to pave the way for em-
ployers to encourage plan participation.52 
The ACA provisions support two different types of wellness programs in-
tended to improve employee health: “participatory wellness programs” and 
“health-contingent wellness programs.”53 Participatory wellness programs are 
available regardless of an individual’s health status.54 Examples include pro-
grams that reimburse employees for enrolling in fitness memberships or pro-
grams that reward employees for attending certain health-education seminars.55 
On the other hand, health-contingent wellness programs require participants to 
meet specific health-related benchmarks in order to obtain a reward.56 An ex-
ample of a health-contingent wellness program is one that provides a reward to 
individuals who do not use tobacco or who decrease their tobacco use.57 An-
other example consistent with new ACA regulations is a program that imple-
ments biometric testing to screen for employees with certain medical condi-
tions or health risks, such as screening for high cholesterol, high blood pres-
sure, or a high body-mass index.58 Once a condition or risk is identified, the 
                                                                                                                           
 51 SOEREN MATTKE ET AL., RAND HEALTH, WORKPLACE WELLNESS PROGRAMS STUDY: FINAL 
REPORT, at xx (2013). 
 52 See How the Affordable Care Act Will Impact Workplace Wellness Programs, MM HAYES 
(JUNE 18, 2013, 10:40 AM), http://www.mmhayes.com/how-the-affordable-care-act-will-impact-
workplace-wellness-programs/ [perma.cc/VD4T-ZAV5]. The article provides an explanation of a 
health-contingent wellness program and reward: 
Let’s say the total annual cost of an employee’s health insurance is $5,000. $2,500 was 
paid by the employer and $2,500 paid by the employee. The enrolled employee could 
receive a $1,500 reduction of their cost as a reward for having a total cholesterol level 
of less than 200 (30% reduction of $5,000). The program could also reduce the employ-
ee’s premium by an additional $1,000 if they had not used tobacco in the last year (add 
an additional 20%  reduction of $5,000). The employee could potentially eliminate their 
out of pocket expense for health insurance if they met the wellness program require-
ments from the rewards they would receive (50% reduction of $5,000 = $2,500). 
Id. 
 53 Incentives For Nondiscriminatory Wellness Programs in Group Health Plans, 78 Fed. Reg. at 
33,160–61 (June 3, 2013). 
 54 Id. at 33,160. 
 55 Id. at 33,160–61. 
 56 Id. Health-contingent wellness programs are further divided into activity-only programs and 
outcome-based programs. Id. at 33,161. Activity-only programs require participants to complete an 
activity, such as diet or exercise programs, in order to obtain a reward. Id. Outcome-based programs 
require a participant to reach a specific health outcome goal or factor, such as quitting smoking or 
lowering one’s body-mass index. Id. Generally, outcome-based programs ask participants to submit to 
testing or screening. Id. Individuals who meet certain health factor benchmarks are offered a reward, 
while individuals who fail to meet the standard are required to participate in additional program re-
quirements until the standard is met in order to obtain the reward. Id. 
 57 See id. at 33,161. 
 58 Id. 
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program can then require the employee to take steps to lower these numbers or 
meet a specific health benchmark to obtain the reward.59 
The definition of reward under ACA regulations is also significant.60 Re-
wards include both positive benefits, such as discounts or rebates, and penal-
ties, such as surcharges or financial disincentives.61 The ACA prohibits em-
ployment-related group health plans and insurers from discriminating against 
an individual on the basis of his or her health status.62 However, incentive-
based wellness programs that hand out rewards and penalties are authorized as 
an exception.63 If a wellness program meets certain requirements, it may im-
plement incentives, discounts, surcharges, and penalties without running the 
risk of violating the ACA.64 Despite their legality, these programs disparately 
impact low-wage employees who cannot afford to opt out of a program in 
which they may not want to participate.65 They also adversely affect individu-
als with disabilities or chronic illnesses and certain racial minorities who are 
more vulnerable to health disparities.66 These populations, already wracked 
with medical expenses, can feel coerced to participate in wellness programs to 
lower their overall healthcare costs.67 They also are less able to attain employ-
er-designated health benchmarks because of inherent health disparities and can 
unjustly face penalties for failing to meet the criteria.68 
                                                                                                                           
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. at 33,160. 
 61 See id. 
 62 Timothy Jost, Implementing Health Reform: Workplace Wellness Programs, HEALTH AFFAIRS 
BLOG (May 29, 2013), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2013/05/29/implementing-health-reform-workplace-
wellness-programs/ [perma.cc/HYK7-NJJN]. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. The ACA adopts the same requirements as the 2006 amendments to the HIPAA. Incentives 
for Nondiscriminatory Wellness Programs in Group Health Plans, 78 Fed. Reg. at 33,159 (June 3, 
2013). Participatory wellness programs are not required to meet the following requirements, but 
health-contingent wellness programs must. Id. These requirements are: 
(i) The reward for the wellness program, coupled with the reward for other wellness 
programs with respect to the plan that require satisfaction of a standard related to a 
health factor, must not exceed 20 percent of the cost of employee-only coverage under 
the plan; 
(ii) The program must be reasonably designed to promote health or prevent disease; 
(iii) The program must give individuals eligible for the program the opportunity to 
qualify for the reward under the program at least once per year; 
(iv) The reward under the program must be available to all similarly situated individu-
als; 
(v) The plan must disclose in all plan materials describing the terms of the program the 
availability of a reasonable alternative standard. 
See T.D. 9298, 2007-1 C.B. 458. 
 65 See Roberts, supra note 30, at 626. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 See Written Testimony of Judith Lichtman, supra note 34. 
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Despite the possibility of negatively affecting low-wage and minority 
populations, with the aforementioned support from the ACA, employers are 
eagerly adopting wellness programs as a means of reducing health insurance 
costs.69 Employer-based wellness is a six billion dollar industry in the United 
States with more than five hundred vendors selling wellness programs.70 Na-
tionally, approximately fifty-one percent of employers with fifty or more em-
ployees offer a wellness program.71 Sixty-nine percent of employers with fifty 
or more employees use financial incentives within their wellness programs to 
encourage employee participation.72 
The ACA’s endorsement is not the only driving force behind the adoption 
of incentive-based wellness programs.73 Rising healthcare costs are pressuring 
employers to shift the cost of health insurance onto their employees.74 For in-
stance, in 2006, sixteen percent of employees in small firms—companies with 
three to 199 workers—were enrolled in a health insurance plan with an annual 
deductible of $1000 or more.75 The figure rose to fifty percent in 2011 and to 
sixty-one percent in 2014.76 In the last decade, premiums for small firms have 
increased by almost sixty-three percent, from $9737 in 2004 to $15,849 in 
2014.77 For large firms, companies with 200 or more workers, premiums have 
increased seventy-two percent, from $10,046 in 2004 to $17,265 in 2014.78 
These statistics reveal a concerning long-term pattern.79 As premiums continue 
to hike, employers are shifting to plans that pressure employees to pay more 
out-of-pocket expenses.80 
B. Health-Contingent Wellness Programs: Walking a Fine Legal Line 
Health-contingent wellness programs bring up several legal concerns.81 
The first is their disparate impact on the most vulnerable populations of em-
                                                                                                                           
 69 See Glatter, supra note 25. 
 70 Begley, supra note 50. 
 71 MATTKE ET AL., supra note 51, at 18. 
 72 Id. at xx. 
 73 See Theo Francis, Companies Prepare to Pass More Health Costs to Workers, WALL ST. J. 
(Nov. 24, 2013, 9:36 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527023046071045792123
51200702342 [perma.cc/SU69-4MHS]. 
 74 Id. 
 75 See KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH AND EDUC. TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH 
BENEFITS: 2014 ANNUAL SURVEY 138 (2014). 
 76 See id. 
 77 See id. at 28. 
 78 See id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 See id.; N.C. Aizenman, Surveys: Health Insurance Costs Shifted to Workers, Even as Premi-
ums Surge, WASH. POST (Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/
survey-rising-health-insurance-costs-shifted-to-workers/2011/09/26/gIQASSpx1K_story.html [per-
ma.cc/9K4L-PEGR]. 
 81 See Written Testimony of Judith Lichtman, supra note 34. 
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ployees.82 Health-contingent wellness programs use financial incentives to re-
ward healthy individuals and to penalize unhealthy individuals.83 As a result, 
the more vulnerable employees—those with health risks and those with socio-
economic barriers to good health—bear greater costs for healthcare.84 These 
populations face greater challenges reaching health factors and benchmarks 
established by employers.85 Incentive-based wellness programs, therefore, 
trigger federal laws due to this unjust impact on sicker and lower-income indi-
viduals.86 
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), discrimination occurs 
when an employer treats an applicant or employee less favorably on the basis 
of a disability, such as cancer, or because of a physical or mental impairment.87 
The ADA prohibits an employer from inquiring into an employee’s disability 
and from requesting that an employee undergo medical examinations, unless it 
is “job-related and consistent with business necessity.”88 Health-contingent 
wellness programs walk a fine line under the ADA when they probe into an 
employee’s disability history, for instance, or penalize an employee who can-
not participate in the program due to his or her disability.89 
Among other federal laws, employer wellness programs may also run 
afoul of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).90 Title VII bans 
discrimination against an individual with respect to his or her “compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . . . .”91 Punitive wellness programs 
generally violate Title VII if they treat a protected class of people, such as a 
racial minority, less favorably than others.92 
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 83 See id. 
 84 Jill R. Horwitz, Brenna Kelly, & John DiNardo, Wellness Incentives in the Workplace: Cost 
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increase medical spending to more than $1000 per individual, and even $2000 per individual for those 
with very high body mass indices. Id. High cholesterol levels have been shown to increase medical 
spending by $2500 per individual and high glucose can increase spending annually by $3300 per indi-
vidual. Id. 
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§ 12102. 
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Despite these concerns, lawsuits asserting that health-contingent wellness 
programs violate federal law have not made much progress towards lessening 
the disparate impact on these vulnerable populations.93 In 2012, in Seff v. 
Broward County, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that a 
wellness program in Florida’s Broward County did not violate the ADA.94 In 
Seff, the wellness program consisted of biometric screening, requiring employ-
ees to participate in a blood test to identify any of the following conditions: 
asthma, hypertension, diabetes, congestive heart failure, or kidney disease.95 
Employees afflicted with one of the conditions were asked to enroll in a dis-
ease management course and were offered co-pay waivers for certain medica-
tions in exchange for their attendance.96 The employer further encouraged par-
ticipation by imposing a twenty-dollar deduction from each paycheck for em-
ployees who refused to participate in the program.97 Bradley Seff, the plaintiff, 
filed a suit against the employer claiming that the ADA prohibited such non-
voluntary examinations and disability-related inquiries.98 The Eleventh Circuit 
rejected this argument and held that the program fell under the ADA’s “bona 
fide plan” exception.99 The court interpreted the wellness program to be a 
“term”—not a stand-alone program—under the county’s health insurance plan 
and, therefore, it fell under the ADA’s safe harbor provision.100 
Recently, in November 2014, the District Court of Minnesota ruled in fa-
vor of Honeywell International Inc. (“Honeywell”) in the lawsuit that the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought against the 
company, discussed in the Introduction of this Note.101 The EEOC argued that 
Honeywell’s incentive-based biomedical testing was in violation of both the 
ADA and the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act (“GINA”) and 
sought a preliminary injunction.102 Judge Montgomery denied the EEOC’s re-
                                                                                                                           
 93 Katie Thomas, Companies Get Strict on Health of Workers, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 25, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/26/business/companies-offer-workers-more-incentives-for-health-
changes.html [perma.cc/PJP4-9NKC]. 
 94 Seff v. Broward Cnty., Fla., 691 F.3d 1221, 1224 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 95 Id. at 1222. 
 96 Id. 
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 99 Id. at 1223, 1224. 
 100 Id. at 1224. The safe harbor provision of the ADA that the court cites states that the ADA 
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ies.” Seff, 691 F.3d at 1223. 
 101 EEOC v. Honeywell Int’l Inc., 2014 WL 5795481, at *6 (D. Minn. 2014). 
 102 Id. at *2. 
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quest to enjoin Honeywell from implementing the program, reasoning that the 
EEOC failed to establish a threat of irreparable harm.103 
II. THE DUPLICITOUS RAMIFICATIONS OF EMPLOYER  
WELLNESS PROGRAMS 
The popularity of employer wellness programs does not appear to be less-
ening.104 Employers are becoming more involved in health plans that encour-
age healthy behaviors to lower healthcare costs; it is apparent that a significant 
relationship exists between the degree of healthcare services received and the 
income, overall health, and in some cases, race, of employees.105 Because of 
the potential detrimental effect wellness programs have on individuals with 
disabilities, low-income employees, and racial minorities, it is crucial to scru-
tinize the balance between the benefits and consequences of such programs.106 
A. Disputed Benefits of Employer Wellness Programs 
As of 2013, approximately one half of American employers offered some 
type of wellness program or initiative.107 The enthusiasm for these programs 
stems from evidence suggesting that employers trust wellness programs to im-
prove employee health, cut down costs, and increase productivity.108 For in-
stance, a 2014 Kaiser Family Foundation survey found that twenty-eight per-
cent of companies providing health benefits considered wellness programs to 
be “very effective” at controlling healthcare costs, and forty-three percent of 
companies considered wellness programs to be “somewhat effective.”109 Ac-
cording to the survey, employers favor this strategy the most for containing 
healthcare costs, even over consumer-driven health plans and narrower provid-
er networks.110 
An unhealthy workplace contributes to increased health-related expenses 
in the forms of medical payments and costs associated with absenteeism.111 
Considering that the Center for Disease Control (CDC) predicts that chronic 
diseases will cost the nation’s healthcare system an estimated $4.2 trillion an-
                                                                                                                           
 103 See id. at *5. (“In sum, great uncertainty persists in regard to how the ACA, ADA and other 
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 104 See Aizenman, supra note 80. 
 105 See id.; Roberts, supra note 30, at 628–29. 
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 108 See KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH AND EDUC. TRUST, supra note 75, at 257; 
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 110 See id. at 262. 
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nually by 2023, a high return on investment is critical for employers imple-
menting workplace wellness programs.112 Moreover, there is also evidence 
suggesting that wellness programs are cost-effective, saving employers money 
in healthcare expenditures.113 In one study it was estimated that, on average, 
medical costs decrease about $3.27 for every one dollar spent on employer 
wellness programs, and costs associated with absenteeism decrease about 
$2.73 for every dollar spent.114 Companies such as Bank of America Corpora-
tion, Johnson & Johnson, and Chevron have reported savings from their well-
ness programs.115 
Despite employers reporting positive outcomes, the overall effectiveness 
of these programs in lowering healthcare costs and improving health is gener-
ally uncertain.116 One study found that the use of rewards correlated with a 
decrease in tobacco use and overall body-mass index in participating employ-
ees, but did not impact their cholesterol levels.117 The study further explained 
that, for every ten dollars offered in incentives, average body-mass indices on-
ly decreased by about 0.03 pounds.118 In the same study, some employers vo-
calized that their wellness programs made positive impacts.119 Of employers 
surveyed, sixty percent reported that their programs did lower healthcare costs, 
but when examined critically, less than half of the employers surveyed regular-
ly evaluated their programs and only two percent provided actual estimates of 
savings.120 Another study conducted by a hospital system in St. Louis, Mis-
souri stated that its workplace wellness program decreased hospitalizations 
among its employees, but did not save the hospital any money.121 
Moreover, many studies on the effectiveness of these programs run up 
against inherent flaws.122 Selection bias, for example, is a concern.123 In a 
study examining the overall health of individuals within a wellness program, if 
only the healthiest employees enrolled in the program, a comparison between 
participants and nonparticipants will likely be skewed to show more progress 
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 113 See id. 
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 115 Anderko et al., supra note 26. 
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2016] Workplace Wellness Programs & Discriminatory Impact 145 
than is actually occurring.124 Other concerns with conducting studies include 
low response rates and publication biases.125 
These issues are closely related to other concerns that potentially under-
mine the effectiveness of wellness programs and place sicker, low-income in-
dividuals and racial minorities at an immediate disadvantage.126 Wellness pro-
grams rewarding employees for healthy behavior applaud those who may have 
already been practicing healthy habits.127 In turn, when penalizing employees 
for unhealthy behavior, these programs are likely neglecting the individuals 
who need low healthcare costs the most.128 Additionally, it is generally more 
difficult to engage individuals with unhealthy habits—for instance, sicker or 
low-income employees—in wellness programs.129 Penalizing these individuals 
for their unhealthy behaviors will, therefore, not likely produce healthier out-
comes.130 Furthermore, there is reason to believe that employees who are inca-
pable of changing their habits and cannot afford the punitive healthcare costs 
may get rid of their coverage altogether.131 
Unfortunately, healthy food options for individuals in low socioeconomic 
circumstances are scarce, putting these populations at an inherent disadvantage 
in the battle for better health and wellbeing.132 The inaccessibility of nutritious 
                                                                                                                           
 124 See id. 
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 129 See Glatter, supra note 25. 
 130 See id. 
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plate_dec2011.pdf [perma.cc/Y33T-8RTN]. 
146 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 36:131 
food, combined with the ease and availability of unhealthy food, is linked to 
obesity and diet-related diseases such as diabetes.133 For instance, many low-
income communities lack access to grocery stores that provide fresh produce 
and whole grains.134 Of those in low-income neighborhoods, where individuals 
often rely on public transportation or walking, 23.5 million people live more 
than one mile away from a grocery store.135 Further, when healthy food is 
available in low-income neighborhoods, it is typically more expensive than 
unhealthy food and is often low quality.136 Moreover, individuals with limited 
resources tend to buy cheaper, energy-dense foods to stretch their budgets.137 
Albeit less expensive, these foods tend to be less nutritious and can exacerbate 
health issues and conditions such as obesity and diabetes.138 
B. Employer Wellness Programs Push Their Legal Limits 
When it comes to instituting employer wellness programs, there is a lin-
gering danger in the fact that their legal intricacies are not yet well under-
stood.139 Many programs require all employees to meet the same or similar 
health benchmarks.140 These uniform approaches are not individualized to ac-
count for each employee’s lifestyle and healthcare needs.141 Penalties for fail-
ing to satisfy one-size-fits-all benchmarks may disparately impact low-income 
individuals, individuals with disabilities, and some racial minorities who lack 
access to healthcare services and are inherently more vulnerable to health dis-
parities.142 This injustice provides employers with a possible loophole to ma-
nipulate the system and reduce their expenses by shifting healthcare costs onto 
employees who cannot reach established benchmarks.143 This cost shifting is 
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discriminatory and violates federal law when it adversely impacts the individ-
uals who need affordable, accessible healthcare the most.144 
1. Americans with Disabilities Act: Forcing Voluntariness 
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) establishes that an employer 
cannot discriminate on the basis of a disability, make disability-related inquir-
ies, or require medical examinations.145 These prohibitions pose the most sig-
nificant legal challenges to incentive-based employer wellness programs.146 
Broadly speaking, the ADA prohibits medical examinations or disability-
related inquiries unless they are made after an offer for employment and are 
“job related and consistent with business necessity.”147 If an employer imple-
ments a voluntary medical examination, it must be “part of an employee health 
program available to employees at that work site.”148 
Simply put, employer wellness programs, including health risk assess-
ments and biometric testing, violate the ADA unless they are voluntary.149 But 
this issue of voluntariness is riddled with legal ambiguities.150 As mentioned in 
the Introduction, this was the heart of the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC)’s case against Honeywell International Inc.151 Because 
there is a lack of coordination between agencies, legislative bodies, and courts 
concerning how to define voluntariness, it remains unclear whether or not the 
acceptance of an incentive in exchange for adopting healthy habits constitutes 
voluntariness.152 Moreover, it is questionable whether participation in a well-
ness program because of the possibility of incurring a penalty for non-
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participation may be considered voluntary.153 These varying levels of induce-
ment blur the legal lines when considering whether a wellness program is truly 
voluntary.154 
First, the concept of voluntariness is extremely concerning for low-
income individuals.155 Low-wage workers who cannot afford to sustain penal-
ties may feel as though participation in a wellness program is their only option 
for avoiding negative incentives.156 But this creates an unfortunate and una-
voidable paradox.157 Low-income and part-time employees—who may be 
working more than one job—generally cannot fully participate in their em-
ployer’s wellness program due to the inflexibility in their schedules, lack of 
access to healthy resources, and a minimal understanding of the program’s 
benefits.158 In 2013, McDonald’s released a sample monthly budget for its 
workers with the intention of providing financial guidance for those earning 
the minimum wage.159 The budget assumed that an employee works two jobs 
and pays twenty dollars per month in healthcare costs.160 Additionally, the 
budget did not include costs for childcare, groceries, or car-related expenses.161 
The daily spending goal calculated to only twenty-five dollars per day per em-
ployee.162 This template budget not only highlights the near impossibility of 
making a living off the minimum wage, especially for those with families, it 
illustrates the severe inequities of employer wellness programs.163 A low-wage 
employee, working two jobs with only twenty-five dollars of daily spending 
money, may feel that participation in a wellness program is mandatory to avoid 
the additional penalties and surcharges associated with non-participation.164 
This is a significant concern when considering the legal parameters of the 
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ADA.165 Moreover, most low-wage workers cannot meet their employer-
designed goals because they cannot afford to adopt healthy habits, such as pay-
ing for gym membership and healthier foods.166 This produces a dangerous 
Catch-22 and the very real potential that employer wellness programs will vio-
late the ADA.167 
 As previously mentioned, the Eleventh Circuit in Seff v. Broward County 
ruled on the issue, finding that a twenty-dollar penalty for noncompliance did 
not make the program involuntary.168 Yet this decision is one of very few that 
addresses this issue.169 The EEOC has not provided concrete recommendations 
on how “voluntary” should be interpreted under the ADA either.170 The lack of 
a formal position on the matter only perpetuates these legal issues to the disad-
vantage of low-wage workers whose livelihoods depend on the rewards or 
penalties they incur through participation in their employer wellness pro-
grams.171 
Wellness programs may also have a disparate impact on individuals with 
disabilities or chronic illnesses.172 Financial penalties for failing to meet 
health-related benchmarks may violate the ADA if an individual cannot reach 
these benchmarks due to a disability or illness.173 For instance, a wellness pro-
gram that promotes walking may create legal implications under the ADA if an 
employee is immobile due to a disability or illness.174 
2. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
When a wellness program disproportionately impacts an individual or 
group of individuals on the basis of their race, sex, religion, or national origin 
it is in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII).175 
These violations typically occur in two ways.176 The first may occur when an 
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employer treats members of a protected class differently than others, which 
constitutes a disparate treatment claim.177 To prove a disparate treatment claim 
an employee must show that the employer treated him or her less favorably 
because of his or her membership in a protected group.178 Generally, a dispar-
ate treatment claim hinges on whether the employer had a discriminatory mo-
tive, although in most situations this motive can be inferred.179 A Title VII vio-
lation can also occur when an employer implements an employment practice or 
program that adversely affects employees in a protected group.180 Unlike a dis-
parate treatment claim, this type of violation is considered disparate impact 
discrimination and can arise even when an employer’s program is neutral on its 
face.181 The employee merely needs to prove that a specific policy has adverse-
ly impacted an individual or group of individuals on the basis of race, sex, col-
or, or national origin.182 Penalties, surcharges, and the denial of rewards for 
noncompliance or for failing to meet health-related benchmarks can danger-
ously toe the line of Title VII violations.183 But this punitive aspect of employ-
er wellness programs is not the only concern when considering Title VII.184 
Even if a wellness program offers a reward to employees who meet certain 
health criteria, the program can still disparately impact those individuals who 
do not achieve the reward.185 Regardless of whether an employer labels its in-
centives as “penalties” or “rewards,” the program will still offend Title VII if 
health insurance costs are disproportionately shifted onto a protected group.186 
Race and ethnicity are inherently linked to health disparities in the United 
States.187 Racial minorities are more vulnerable to diabetes, heart disease, and 
obesity.188 Diabetes is more prevalent among African Americans than white 
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Americans.189 Approximately 6.5% of white males and 5.4% of white females 
have diagnosed diabetes in the United States, while 9.9% of African American 
males and 9% of African American females are diagnosed with the disease.190 
Compared to non-Hispanic white Americans, African Americans are two times 
as likely to be diagnosed with diabetes.191 Among Asian populations, the prev-
alence of diabetes is approximately 7.8% among males and 5.5% among fe-
males.192 Hispanic adults are more likely than non-Hispanic white Americans 
to have diabetes and are even more likely to be diagnosed with certain types of 
cancer.193 
Moreover, heart disease is the first leading cause of death in the United 
States; its prevention is strongly linked to modifiable risk factors such as high 
cholesterol, blood pressure, diabetes, obesity, tobacco use, and lack of exer-
cise.194 American Indians and multiracial Americans are more likely than non-
Hispanic white Americans to have a history of myocardial infarctions and cor-
onary heart disease.195 And more African American women have died before 
their seventy-fifth birthday as a result of coronary heart disease than white 
American women.196 A higher percentage of African American women have 
also suffered strokes as compared to white American women.197 In terms of 
obesity, the prevalence is notably higher in African Americans than white 
Americans.198 
Employer wellness programs may be designed with the intention to cor-
rect some of these aforementioned health issues, but they still have the poten-
tial to cross the legal boundaries of Title VII when they shift costs onto popula-
tions that cannot meet designated health criteria.199 Because certain racial mi-
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norities are more susceptible to health problems such as diabetes, heart disease, 
and obesity, punitive measures for failing to reach benchmarks, such as lower 
body mass index or lower cholesterol, have the very real potential to disparate-
ly impact these populations.200 To surpass this Title VII hurdle, an employer 
would have to show that the program is “consistent with business necessity,” 
“necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the business,” and “of great 
importance to job performance.”201 However, if an alternative practice or pro-
cedure exists that can effectively carry out the purpose of the program and is 
less discriminatory, then the program in question would not be considered a 
business necessity.202 
III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO COMBAT DISCRIMINATION IN  
WORKPLACE WELLNESS PROGRAMS 
Curbing rising healthcare costs and increasing access to quality healthcare 
are two critical issues facing the nation that are fundamentally at odds with 
each other.203 As a solution to escalating healthcare costs, many employers are 
turning to workplace wellness programs.204 Despite their disputed benefits, 
because of their disparate impact on certain employees, workplace wellness 
programs may serve as a subterfuge for unlawful discrimination.205 
Abandonment of workplace wellness programs seems unlikely due to en-
dorsements from the Affordable Care Act (ACA) and soaring healthcare 
costs.206 Thus, in order to properly protect those who are most vulnerable to 
disparate treatment from these programs—low-income individuals, individuals 
with disabilities, and racial minorities—resulting from discriminatory cost-
shifting, the following changes should be made: (1) the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) must provide guidance regarding workplace 
wellness discrimination; (2) the EEOC needs to adequately exercise its power 
as an enforcer of anti-discrimination laws within workplace wellness employ-
                                                                                                                           
 200 See id. 
 201 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2012); see also Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 589, 622–
23 n.3 (2009) (holding that the City of New Haven, Connecticut’s firefighter test violated Title VII 
because the city lacked a strong basis in evidence that it would have been subject to disparate impact 
liability if it had failed to take the discriminatory action); Williams v. Colo. Springs, Colo. Sch. Dist. 
No. 11, 641 F.2d 835, 842 (10th Cir. 1981) (determining that a disparate impact is found when em-
ployment practices are facially neutral but in fact adversely impact one group over another and cannot 
be justified by a business necessity). 
 202 See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 592, 593. 
 203 See Rubenstein, supra note 156, at 99–100. The U.S. is expected to spend nearly $4.3 trillion 
on health-related services by 2018. Id. This figure is more than twice the amount the U.S. was spend-
ing in 2008. Id. Despite this expense, in terms of quality and access to healthcare, the U.S. remains 
one of the lowest-ranking developed countries. Id. 
 204 Id. at 100. 
 205 See Written Testimony of Judith Lichtman, supra note 34. 
 206 See Glatter, supra note 25. 
2016] Workplace Wellness Programs & Discriminatory Impact 153 
ment; and (3) the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) 
must be amended to better define “voluntariness” within the realm of incen-
tives and penalties.207 
A. The EEOC’s Obligation to Issue Clear and Explicit Guidance 
The U.S. Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court have yet to concretely 
address and clarify the factors that constitute discriminatory practice in work-
place wellness programs.208 This lack of clarity has left federal and state courts 
directionless, and facilitates inconsistent and unpredictable rulings that will 
mislead and confuse employers and employees.209 
To help mitigate this problem, the EEOC must offer clear and explicit 
guidance regarding discriminatory practices in workplace wellness pro-
grams.210 As a federal government agency and the leading investigative author-
ity on charges of discrimination against employers, the EEOC is a persuasive 
authority within the court system.211 The agency is therefore in the prime posi-
tion to provide clarity to these issues by explaining the types of practices that 
violate anti-discrimination laws and promulgating lawful frameworks for well-
ness programs.212 
In 2000, the EEOC issued a compliance manual addressing discrimination 
in regards to employee benefits.213 The purpose of the manual was to provide 
                                                                                                                           
 207 See Incentives for Nondiscriminatory Wellness Programs in Group Health Plans, 78 Fed. Reg. 
33,159 (June 3, 2013); Written Testimony of Judith Lichtman, supra note 34. 
 208 See Sizemore, supra note 150, at 667. 
 209 See id. For instance, some states broadly define the term “disabled” under the ADA and con-
sequentially cover more individuals who may qualify for this protection. See Lucinda Jesson, Weigh-
ing the Wellness Programs: The Legal Implications of Imposing Personal Responsibility Obligations, 
15 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 217, 265 (2008). Minnesota’s definition of “disability” is interpreted more 
broadly than that of the ADA. See id. Minnesota defines a “disability” as “a physical, sensory, or 
mental impairment which materially limits one or more major life activities.” MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 363A.03 (2007) (emphasis added). On the other hand, the ADA defines a “disability” as a physical 
or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such individual. 42 
U.S.C. § 12102 (emphasis added). As another example, some state courts are grappling with the issue 
of whether obesity qualifies as a disability within the scope of employment discrimination and are 
producing conflicting rulings. Compare Viscik v. Fowler Equip. Co., 800 A.2d 826, 836 (N.J. 2002) 
(determining that the former employee’s obesity constituted a handicap under the state’s discrimina-
tion law), with Cassista v. Cmty. Foods, Inc., 856 P.2d 1143, 1154 (Cal. 1993) (finding insufficient 
evidence that plaintiff’s weight of more than 300 pounds was the result of a physiological condition or 
disorder, and thus the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination). 
 210 Written Testimony of Judith Lichtman, supra note 34. 
 211 Sizemore, supra note 150, at 664 (“While the EEOC’s informal guidance is not binding, it is 
persuasive and carries the weight of the administrative agency charged with interpreting and enforcing 
the ADA and GINA.”). 
 212 See Written Testimony of Judith Lichtman, supra note 34. 
 213 See id.; EEOC Employment Compliance Manual, Chapter 3: Employment Benefits, EQUAL 
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Oct. 3, 2000), http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/benefits.html 
[perma.cc/QPA3-FGM9 ] [hereinafter EEOC 2000 Employment Benefits Compliance Manual]. 
154 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 36:131 
guidance on discriminatory issues relating to life and health insurance benefits, 
disability benefits, severance benefits, pension benefits, and early retirement 
incentives.214 The manual also touched upon disparate impact claims in em-
ployee benefits as they relate to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title 
VII) and Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) violations.215 However, the 
manual, now outdated by more than a decade, did not provide specific guid-
ance regarding discrimination within workplace wellness programs.216 Because 
employers depend on the EEOC for direction when developing workplace 
wellness programs, it is imperative for the EEOC to release guidance explain-
ing how to best craft programs that do not violate federal anti-discrimination 
laws.217 Employers need to understand the intricacies of the law in order to 
develop programs that do not disproportionately impact or raise costs for low-
income individuals or other protected groups, such as racial minorities and in-
dividuals with disabilities.218 For instance, the EEOC can develop and issue the 
framework for programs that are truly voluntary and do not penalize employ-
ees for failing to meet benchmarks, and the EEOC could help establish pro-
grams that provide reasonable alternatives for those individuals who cannot 
satisfy employer-based health factors.219 
B. The EEOC as a Critical Enforcer of the Law 
In its five-decade history, the EEOC has processed the majority of em-
ployment discrimination claims that are not pursued in the private sector, yet 
discrimination in the workplace remains a prevalent problem.220 The legal rea-
sons behind this may primarily be attributed to two factors: the EEOC’s evolu-
tion from an investigative unit to an intake and processing machine and the 
EEOC’s limited role in employment litigation.221 Thus, to forcefully wield 
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whatever resources the agency has, it needs to pursue claims that relate to sig-
nificant legal issues and provide opportunities to force courts to expound the 
law.222 
First, the EEOC has been unable to keep up with the sheer number of 
charges due to administrative burden.223 When the EEOC was initially created, 
it was primarily intended to investigate claims relating to employer discrimina-
tion.224 Congress, however, did not appropriately account for the number of 
claims the EEOC would have to process and, as a result, the agency collected 
an insurmountable backlog.225 As University of Baltimore Law School Profes-
sor Nancy M. Modesitt colorfully explained, “This backlog of charges has con-
tinued to keep the EEOC in the position where it is treading water—managing 
the huge number of claims without substantively investigating them.”226 Thus, 
the EEOC fell into a pattern in which it accepted charges it was unable to suf-
ficiently investigate.227 
Second, unlike other federal agencies, the EEOC lacks the power to sanc-
tion violators.228 Because of this, its enforcement power rests primarily in its 
ability to file suit against employers on behalf of employees.229 The resulting 
problem is that the EEOC tends to focus its efforts on smaller cases that typi-
cally involve lost wages of less than ten thousand dollars.230 This can be linked 
to several factors, including the EEOC’s ability to select its own cases, allow-
ing the agency to select smaller cases with higher success rates, or it may be 
linked to the size of the EEOC’s litigation program.231 Because of the EEOC’s 
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limited enforcement power, it must systematically and continuously pursue 
significant litigation that protects vulnerable and low-wage workers against 
discriminatory cost-shifting practices that issue penalties for noncompliance.232 
There is no doubt that the EEOC has limited resources in its litigation pro-
gram.233 But this can be no excuse for inaction.234 The EEOC needs to apply 
pressure on employers and courts; by continuously pursuing meritorious litiga-
tion, employers will gradually learn to comply with nondiscrimination laws as 
they design and implement their workplace wellness programs.235 This will 
also help relieve the administrative burden of collecting all complaints of dis-
crimination.236 For instance, the agency would not have to manage the mass of 
complaints it receives each year, including drafting and mailing the thousands 
of right-to-sue letters that are required before an employee is able to bring suit 
in court.237 If the EEOC limits the number of cases it investigates and litigates, 
and focuses solely on significant, novel, meritorious claims, it can better fulfill 
the job that it has been set out to do—end discrimination in the workplace.238 
C. The Need to Amend HIPAA 
Many employers allege that their workplace wellness programs are volun-
tary.239 Yet the imposition of financial incentives and penalties to induce partic-
ipation casts serious doubt on such assertions.240 For instance, a sizeable re-
ward or reduction in premiums may not sway a high-earning individual to par-
ticipate in a wellness program, but any reward or reduction may be very ap-
pealing to a low-income individual.241 Low-income employees are more likely 
to take advantage of financial inducements and thus, more often than not, find 
themselves at the economic will of their employers.242 
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As previously noted, there is a disconcerting lack of guidance and coordi-
nation between agencies, legislative bodies, and courts concerning this issue of 
voluntariness.243 This is especially troublesome when it comes to the protec-
tion of low-income individuals, racial minorities, and individuals with disabili-
ties.244 One possible way to mitigate this is to address the root of the problem: 
HIPAA.245 HIPAA’s nondiscrimination requirements apply to all health plans, 
whether public or private.246 But as it currently stands, HIPAA only monitors 
and limits penalties and incentives within group health plans.247 A wellness 
program that encourages an employee’s personal responsibility in healthcare 
falls outside of HIPAA’s purview.248 
HIPAA needs to be amended to provide limitations on an employee’s per-
sonal responsibility in his or her healthcare, and to guarantee that a partici-
pant’s involvement in a workplace wellness program is a purely voluntary de-
cision.249 Specifically, any modification to HIPAA must include a clear, pre-
cise, and fair definition of “voluntary” that can cohesively supplant the dis-
criminatory practices inherent in employer wellness programs.250 
These necessary amendments will consequentially impact all employers 
with applicable, lawful health plans under HIPAA.251 With additional clarity as 
to the intricacies of “voluntariness,” employers will be able to better design 
their wellness programs by providing a multitude of options for employees.252 
Wellness plans need to be diverse in options to account for each individual’s 
socioeconomic and health-related circumstances, instead of a one-size-fits-all 
approach that requires participation in order to obtain a benefit.253 By assuring 
that a participant’s involvement in a workplace wellness program is truly vol-
untary, compliance with the ADA and Title VII will likely be met and the dan-
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ger of employee discrimination on the basis of income, race, and disability will 
subside.254 
CONCLUSION 
Workplace wellness programs are expanding at an exponential rate and 
are quickly becoming the norm for employers hoping to lower healthcare costs 
and improve the overall health and longevity of their workforce. These pro-
grams serve a significant role in incentivizing employees to get healthy, there-
by reducing health-related illnesses and fostering the wellbeing of workers. Yet 
an increased risk of abuse flows as an inevitable result of this system: through 
the issuance of rewards and penalties, employers will disproportionately shift 
the cost of healthcare onto vulnerable populations who need affordable 
healthcare services the most. As a society, we should not tolerate the inherent 
discrimination that occurs within these programs as healthcare costs are shifted 
onto low-income individuals, certain racial minorities, and individuals with 
disabilities. To combat this problem, the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission must step up as an authority in this field to guide implementation 
and enforcement of lawful wellness programs. Additionally, the Health Insur-
ance Portability and Accountability Act should be modified to ensure that all 
workplace wellness programs are genuinely and effectively voluntary. All 
working Americans—regardless of background, race, health status, or in-
come—should have the choice to voluntarily enjoy the benefits of workplace 
wellness programs, without running the risk of incurring higher healthcare 
costs. 
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